財經導讀 【 黃國英 - 牛熊推論殊途同歸 - 2009．04．22 】

英之見：牛熊推論殊途同歸
黃國英

美銀（BAC）拖低金融股，加上中移動（941）續差，兩大藍籌失去動力，確認了16000點不易攻破，正路看上升空間既然有限，調整便應該較深才合理，但其他股份表現不算差，石化股及汽車股在好消息刺激下造好，反映市場戰意尚在，甚至即月認沽期權也不算太勁。維持原判，目前仍在穩定期之中，避開弱勢股，繼續選擇性趁低吸納。
有甚大機會看錯市，投資兩大忌是怕輸及固執，只要有心理準備，萬一形勢惡化，就急速撤退或者做足對冲，看錯市亦不會致命。

大型上落市難避免

至於較長期的看法，到底目前不外是熊市中的反彈，抑或是一個新牛市正在醞釀，其實在現階段不必太執着，因為兩者的走勢預測，在未來幾個月應該是差不多。
自己偏向是熊市反彈，可是熊市也有多個階段，我們已有好幾次極度恐慌的經驗，加上看過由政策推動又快又勁的反彈，對壞消息既有預期，低位造淡亦有戒心。下次要再勁跌，是市場要對公司業績失望，發現有生意不等於有盈利之後，但這個認知轉變要一段日子，所以會有一段上落市的穩定期。
另一個可能則是新牛市在誕生，不妨參考沙士之後到直通車為止的這個超級大牛市的形態。在沙士約8300見底，急速回升至大約14000完成了第一個升浪之後，要等了差不多一年半之後，才能夠再次發力上升，可見牛市初期同樣是要經歷一段整固期。
兩者結論殊途同歸，都是一段日子於一個大範圍內上落。沙士後的整固期，出現了零售股及澳門股等微型泡沫，資源股則醞釀成大市龍頭，現時來看，內需股及新能源有機會崛起，萬一是熊市再跌，最危險仍是紙上資產的金融股，一邊買一邊造淡，便做齊了兩手準備。

相關文章﹕
黃國英的長線持股組合及教你恆指反彈見頂先兆

財經導讀﹕末日博士主張國有化資不抵債銀行

「末日博士」(Dr Doom)魯比尼(Nouriel Roubini)主張國有化資不抵債銀行

資不抵債銀行宜國有化

一年前，我預計美國金融機構的虧損將達到1萬億美元，甚至可能高達2萬億美元。當時經濟學家及決策者的共識是這些估計言過其實，因為人們相信次按損失只有大約2000億美元。

正如我所指出的，隨着美國及全球經濟滑入嚴重的衰退，銀行虧損將大大超出次按領域，包括次按，近次按及優等房貸、商業房地產、信用卡、車貸、學生貸款、企業及商業貸款、企業債券、國家、州及地方政府債券，以及所有這些貸款證券化資產的虧損。從那時開始，美國銀行的撇賬已經超出了1萬億美元（也就是我的最低估計），而國際貨幣基金組織及高盛等機構現在估計虧損要超出2萬億美元。

英銀行情況相同

不過，如果你認為2萬億美元的數字已經龐大，那麼我的研究諮詢公司RGE所做的估計，表明美國各金融公司做出的貸款總體虧損及其持有的資產市值下跌將高達約3.6萬億美元。

美國銀行及證券公司要承擔一半的風險，或者是1.8萬億美元。剩下來的將由美國及世界各地的其他金融機構承擔。去年秋天支撑銀行資產的資本只有1.4萬億美元，這樣美國銀行系統將欠缺4000億美元。或許政府及私營部門給這些銀行注資後，也是接近零。

銀行還需要1.5萬億美元，才能令資本回到危機前的水平。人們需要這些錢才能解決信貸緊縮問題及恢復向私營部門借貸。所以在整體上，美國的銀行體系已經實際上資不抵債了。英國的銀行體系大體上也是資不抵債，而且許多歐洲大陸的銀行也是如此。

一般而言，人們有四種途經來清理面臨體制危機的銀行系統。分別是給銀行重新注資外加政府「壞銀行」購買其有毒資產、重新注資外加政府擔保有毒資產（銀行首先要承擔虧損）、政府擔保下的私人購買有毒資產（也是美國政府目前的方案），以及直接國有化（如果不喜歡國有化這個說法，就叫「政府破產管理」）資不抵債的銀行，並且在清理之後重新賣給私營部門。
「壞銀行」缺點太多

以上四種選擇中，前三個存在嚴重的缺陷。在「壞銀行」模式中，政府可能會為不良資產支付過多，這些不良資產的實際價值無法確定。即使是在擔保模式中，也會隱藏着過多支付的問題（或過度擔保，政府收取的費用並未能合理定價）。

在「壞銀行」模式中，政府管理其收購的所有不良資產又帶來新的問題，因為政府沒有專長和經驗來完成這一任務。美國財政部笨拙的方案就是把有毒資產從銀行資產負債表上剝離，同時提供政府擔保。這一模式過於缺乏透明度及複雜，因此這方案一經宣布，股市隨即大跌。

因此在似是而非的情況下，國有化或許是一個更為傾向於市場的方案。這一方案把明顯資不抵債機構的普通股及優先股一掃而空，如果資不抵債過於龐大，甚至包括未經擔保的債權人。與此同時，這一方案給予納稅人一定的好處。通過在政府擔保條件下在清理不良資產後，向新的私人股東轉售大部分資產及存款，這一方案還可以解決管理銀行不良資產的問題（因為Indy Mac倒閉時就是這樣處理）。

重整資本出售

國有化還解決了銀行規模過大難以倒閉的問題。這些銀行舉足輕重，因此政府就須要以納稅人高昂的代價予以挽救。這問題確實已經變得更大，因為目前的做法已經導致體弱的銀行接管更加體弱的銀行。

兼併這些借屍還魂的銀行，就像是醉鬼互相幫助站起來。摩根大通接管貝爾斯登及華盛頓互惠銀行、美銀接管Countrywide及美林集團、以及富國銀行接管美聯銀行，這些案例都突出了這一問題。隨着國有化，政府就可以分解這些金融怪物，並且以規模較小但資本良好的銀行面目出售給私人投資者。

瑞典在九十年代早期銀行危機的時候成功地採用了這一手法，而美國及英國目前的措施可能會最終產生日本式的借屍還魂銀行。這些銀行從來就沒有得到妥善的重組，並且無限期延長了信貸凍結。日本由於未能清理銀行問題而經歷了長達十年的接近蕭條困境。美國、英國及其他經濟體如果未能採取合理行動，將有相似的風險，也就是數年的衰退及通貨緊縮。

作者為紐約大學斯特恩商學院經濟學教授，經濟和金融諮詢機構RGE Monitor（www.rgemonitor.com）的主席。

版權所有：Project Syndicate，2009年
(原文﹕http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roubini11)

財經導讀 [ Bill Gross - So CQish ]

我們都被貪婪蒙蔽了我們的常識....債王這一篇文章值得我們停下來反思。

http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2008/IO+Gross+November+2008+So+CQish.htm

I think of myself as a pretty smart guy, but not that smart, if you know what I mean; no Mensa candidate but intelligent enough to earn a few paper degrees that helped get me a job where the real education began. My mother used to tell me that I had the highest IQ of all the first graders in Butler County, Ohio, which sounded impressive until I figured out that there were just a handful of kids that had taken the test. You’re smart but not a genius if you graduated “non” cum laude from both Duke and UCLA graduate school. That’s me. Still, I’ll take it because I’ve come to the conclusion that success – at least in a career – requires more than an IQ. It requires a CQ.

A CQ is what I think of as a “Common Sense Quotient.” It refers to an ability to not just absorb information and recycle it upon demand, but to analyze it and apply it within a uniquely different environment or context. A CQ Mensa candidate is able to view the world in a state of apparent equilibrium and wonder – “does this make sense?” And if not, “what might change it, and when?” The problem with measuring CQ, however, is that you never can be quite sure that you or anyone else has it. It’s elusive and perhaps even ephemeral. It’s also uniquely personal: the world always makes sense when viewed from your own eyes – it’s those other people who can’t seem to understand. Still – in the business and investment worlds – time has a habit of unmasking one-dimensional pretenders who have the obvious IQ, but score below 100 with an experience-tested CQ. Warren Buffett, a bona fide Mensa in both categories, said it best many years ago in his usual folksy way: “You don’t know who’s swimming naked until the tide goes out.”

CQs, then, in Buffett’s metaphor, know that protective cover-ups – call them swimming-suit insurance policies – should be worn even when the water’s high and the whole world seems to be enjoying an endless summer at the beach. That is an apt description of the global investment environment up until Bear Stearns 2008. The world seemed so caught up in the long-term unfolding of the “Great Moderation” that almost everyone assumed that nothing could go wrong. I heard a brilliant, high-IQ portfolio manager describe himself on the radio a few days ago as a “child of the 25-year secular bull market – trained to buy on dips.” In fact, we all are bull market children. But those that define it by “dip buying,” or a secular time frame encompassing only the past quarter century, are certainly self-limiting and perhaps lacking in common sense. The era now coming to an end is not a one-generational bull market that was born out of the ashes of double-digit inflation, and the end of governmental strangulation of private initiative in the early 1980s. It was much more, and much longer in duration.

The past era can best be described as a more than half-century build up in credit extension and levered finance. While home mortgages or buying a washing machine on “time” began in the early decades of the 20th century, the use and innovative application of credit really began when – well, when I was born. 1944 is as good a year as any to chronicle the beginning of our levered economy. I was a child of war, but also a child of a new global leadership confirmed at Bretton Woods and founded on faith in the U.S. dollar and the healing power that its printing could bring to the global community. That Richard Nixon amended the bargain in the early 1970s did no immediate damage save for the inflationary decade that followed. Credit continued to be the mighty lubricant of capitalism’s engine, allowing its pistons to accelerate at an increasing pace as financial innovation mixed with our own animal spirits produced more and more profits, more and more jobs, more and more everything. Mortgage-backed GNMAs in the 1970s, financial futures a bit later, swaps, then credit default swaps (CDS) – the litany is too long to list.

What is important, though, is that at some point early in the 21st century, things began to go terribly wrong with this miracle of modern finance. It was spreading substantial benefits via diversification and indeed the productive powers of lending upon which capitalism depends. But it had assumed an arrogance – if a secular phenomenon can be personified – that nothing could go wrong. It was promoting not just smooth sailing – a moderation – but a “great moderation.” Unstoppable. Except, of course, for that homeowner in Modesto, California, who bought a marked-up home for $500,000 with no money down and a 2% teaser interest rate. Even the pinnacle of levered finance could not support that fantasy and so, as yields inevitably rose and the defaults began in 2006, our great moderation was exposed for what it was – a naked swimmer at high tide.

And so – “bravo, brava,” a metaphorical history of the human comedy as experienced by Bill Gross since 1944. How prescient, how personal, how CQish, how self-serving. I suppose. But PIMCO’s still standing, and that in this month of October 2008 is as strong a testament to a collective CQ as any I know. We’ve got some Mensans to be sure, but a bunch of high CQs as well, including my partner on the investment desk, Mohamed El-Erian, who like Buffett, is probably a dual Mensa but would be the last to admit it.

For those of you who are reading these Outlooks for more than just a history lesson and a commercial, however, let me point you to our latest commonsensical thought piece, one that can be explained with a simple diagram that resembles an atom of uranium – one of nature’s more unstable elements.

Uranium-238 has something like 92 electrons circling its nucleus, sort of like the diagram you see in Figure 1. And, importantly, uranium-238 is metaphorically quite similar to the global financial system of the past half century. At its nucleus was the overnight Fed Funds rate which, when priced low enough, led to an ever-increasing circle of productive financial electrons. The overnight policy rate led to cheap commercial paper borrowing and then leapfrogged outward and across the oceans to become LIBOR. In turn, government notes and bonds as well as markets for corporate obligations were created, leading to their use as collateral (repos), which fostered additional credit and additional growth. The electrons morphed into productive financial futures and derivatives of all kinds benefitting all of the asset classes at the outer edge of the #238 atom – stocks, high yield bonds, private equity, even homes and commodities despite their being tangible as opposed to financial assets.

This was how the scientists, the financial wizards with Mensa IQs, visualized the financial system a few years ago: leverageable assets held together by a central bank policy rate at its nucleus with institutional participants playing by the rules of conservative self interest and moderate government regulation. Out of it came exceptionally high returns on assets with minimal risk – the highest returns occurring with the most levered electrons farthest from the nucleus.

Over the past year, however, the process has reversed course and your 401k is probably a 201k now. Levering has turned into deleveraging; uranium-238 has morphed into uranium-239 and we’ve had a nuclear implosion – destructive fusion not controllable fission. What’s an investor to do? The simplest way to explain this is that during the past 60 years or so, an investor wanted to follow the energy outward from the nucleus. A financial system in the process of levering leads to excessive returns for electrons on the perimeter. When the process reverses, however, when fusion takes over, an investor wants to be at the center – in Treasury bills or bank CDs. In fact, over the past 12 months, those government-guaranteed, low-durational assets have been virtually the only ones to show positive returns.

There will come a time, however, perhaps over the next few weeks or months, when deleveraging of the private sector is met by the leveraging up of the government sectors: the TARP, CPFF, and MMIFF will inject over a trillion dollars of liquidity into the system over a short period of time. At that point, our nuclear atom will begin to stabilize and it should be safer to move a little distance back out toward the perimeter where yields and potential returns are very attractive. PIMCO would focus on the following:

1. A continued above-average allocation to agency mortgage-backed securities – now yielding close to 6%.
   
2. An overweight position in bank capital – bonds and preferred stock in companies where the Treasury has an equity stake. With Uncle Sam as your partner, default seems remote.
   
3. A focus on the frontend of the yield curve. The Fed will stay low for an extended period of time while the inevitable inflationary pressures of government bailouts lay further out on the yield curve.

Can these and a host of other investment ideas come from a commonsensical understanding of the uranium atom, the difference between fission and fusion, and its metaphorical connection to levering and delevering? We at PIMCO think so. Our CQs are engaged, our bathing suits are on; the tide goes out, but inevitably comes back in.

William H. Gross
Managing Director

財經導讀 [ 股爺 - 股海淘金－－只贏不輸 ]

股爺 - 股海淘金－－只贏不輸
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/yes_3721/article?mid=5670

以前會認為股票學問博大精深, 技術分析易學難精。 但現階段發現所有的一齊都不如心理質素來得重要, 無休止的交易, 無間斷的忐忑, 無根據的入市, 無情理的止蝕... 種種都是散户投資者常犯的錯誤。 如許浩男師傅所說, 我們要做賊, 更要做大賊 !!
(期待 股爺 所講既 "價值投資區" )


http://dl4.hkreporter.com/files/new/mf_2009-02-11_2_2e2f.mp3
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